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REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE VIETNAM
MOBILIZATION DECISION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. BRUEN, USA

mobilization of the Reserves and National
Guard was initiated under the President's
emergency authority for a call-up not to
exceed one million men. He had to declare a
national emergency to invoke it. These
mobilization efforts were made palatable to
the American public because the US forces
were to be present in Korea under the
auspices of the United Nations. Many of the
personnel procedures used then were to be
repeated later. This was to be the first major
conflict in which large-scale use of individual
replacements, even for mobilized units, was to
occur. Many of the National Guardsmen who
arrived in Korea with the units to which they
were assigned did not remain with their units,
but were reassigned as replacements in other
units. This procedure, and the criticism it
engendered, had a marked influence on the
position taken by some members of Congress
during later mobilization discussions.
In the summer of 1961 the Soviet Union
precipitated a crisis over the status of control
in Berlin. In order to meet this crisis and
provide additional alternatives to massive
retaliation, our general purpose forces were
increased i n size. I n t h e process,
approximately 148,000 personnel in Guard
and Reserve units were ordered to active duty
for one year or less. Even this partial
mobilization was strongly debated in both
houses of Congress.2 President Kennedy
could have declared a national emergency, but
preferred to avoid the possibility that a huge
mobilization would create panic in the United
States and the Soviet Union. Instead, he
requested that Congress enact a joint
resolution providing him with the authority
to call not more than 250,000 men-either
individually or in units. The resolution was
passed.

(Why didn't the United States mobilize
for the Vietnam conflict? What were the
repercussions of this decision? What must
be done to improve mobilization
procedures and readiness in the future?)

Historically, the Congress of the United
States has been determined to avoid
involvement in the conflicts of other nations.
However, there have been several occasions
when the Reserves or National Guard have
been mobilized without a declaration of war.
We need only look to the Mexican-American
b o r d e r d i s p u t e ( 1 9 1 4-1918), Korea
(1950-1953), Berlin ( 1961), and Cuba (1962)
for examples. Even President Roosevelt, prior
to World War I I , had to use all of his political
influence to block a Congressional resolution
which would have required a national
referendum to bring the United States into
that conflict.1
The United States did not declare war
during the Korean conflict; however, a major
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During congressional hearings held the
following year to extend the joint resolution
a u t h o r i t y , Chairman Russell expressed
concern about the President's avoidance of a
declaration of national emergency. He told
the Secretary of Defense that: "We should
broaden the base of those serving in the
military forces of this country, and [see to it]
that the obligations of defense should be as
widely shared as is humanly possible to do
so." 3 Chairman Russell mentioned that the
Korean war was fought by veterans of World
War I I while millions of others were not
called, and he considered it unfair. There was
much discussion on this point and Senator
Case recommended expanding the draft rather
than calling the Reserves.4 Chairman Russell
then informed Secretary McNamara: "I want
you to make it clear that you are not
unnecessarily going to call up people who
have already performed their duty, but to fill
them [units] with draftees."5 The extension
of the joint resolution authority was approved
for one additional year, but the total number
authorized for call-up was reduced from
250,000 to 150,000 (approximately what was
called for Berlin). This effort alerted the
Defense Department to the unfavorable
reaction by some senior members of Congress
to mobilization in general; and the apparent
acceptance of a major expansion of the draft
to meet increased force requirements and to
distribute the "burden" of service equitably.
Some Congressmen still expressed support for
a call-up in any emergency. During the 1962
hearings on the Joint Resolution, Senator
Stennis made an important comment on the
success of the Berlin mobilization:

We called up Reserve and Guard units
[for Berlin], assumingthat the number of
men assigned to them were properly
qualified, only to find out that in order
to meet prescribed strength levels,
strength objectives, they had accepted
men through recruitment who were not
qualified for the occupational specialties
required for that particular type of unit.7
A small percentage of the Reserves were
involuntarily recalled (as individuals) from
non-drill status, and these fillers were the
cause of most problems. The Reserves had not

been indoctrinated with the fact that they
could expect to be called up at any time for
any reason.8 [Emphasis added by the author
of this article. ]
It should be remembered that the armed
forces had counted on mobilization of the
Reserves and National Guard in any major
conflict. In September 1964 General Curtis
LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, in an article
in The Officer Magazine entitled "The Use of
Reserves in Future Crises," reviewed Air
Force call-ups for Korea, Berlin, and Cuba. He
alerted the Air Force Reserve and Air
National Guard that they could expect to be
called in any new emergency.9 At the same
time, Army contingency planning was based
upon the assumption that the commitment of
a major portion of STRAF (Strategic Army
Forces) would result in mobilization, and that
the forces for sustained combat operations
would be provided by the Reserves.10 The
military had anticipated and prepared for
mobilization. However, during this period
Secretary McNamara was again attempting to
reorganize the National Guard and Reserve.
The reorganization efforts plus the transfer of
equipment to active units had a major impact
on the mobilization readiness of the Army
Reserves.
T h e s e a r e the circumstances which
influenced the decision-with regard to
mobilization as the United States became
more and more involved in Vietnam; and
these are the factors which led to the
executive decision t o override the
recommendation of the senior military leaders
to mobilize the Reserves and National Guard.

General Clay testified before the
preparedness subcommittee this spring.
He was in Berlin a year ago, as everyone
remembers, and he said the psychological
advantage of a call-up over there was
tremendous, not only to the West
Berliners but to our adversaries.6
However, Secretary McNamara testified that
the Reserves were not ready when called for
Berlin:
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THE DECISION

In 1965 President Johnson made the
decision to increase the size of the armed
forces for the Vietnam buildup by relying on
the Selective Service System and the various
officer recruitment programs, rather than by
mobilizing the Reserves and the National
Guard. There was a small mobilization of
Reserves in 1968; however, all of the
individuals were released by the end of 1969.
The Vietnam mobilization decision was
considered primarily in political terms. It was
a case of military action being directed
because there were no other actions which
would be politically acceptable. A Joint
Congressional Resolution had been proposed,
similar to the one for the Berlin call-up,
affirming support of the military action taken
thus far in Vietnam and eliminating the need

for a Presidential Declaration o f National
Emergency. I t was hoped that an acceptance
of the Resolution would be followed by
support of the people.
But such acceptance did not materialize.
There was no way of knowing what the total
force requirements would be to assist the
Vietnamese Government. There were no
precedents; and it was soon learned that in a
protracted, limited war, in which individuals
rather than units are replaced, there's a
tendency to underestimate the number of
troops required. However, military leaders
had warned of the costs and requirements in
terms of men and time.
Sound estimates of the costs and
requirements were available before the
first U.S. combat troops were committed
in March 1965. Both the Army Chief of
Staff and Marine Commandant are on
record in the early months of 1965
before our massive buildup in Vietnam, as
estimating that the victory there would
require 500,000 to 800,000 men and
would take years of effort.11
T h e J o i n t Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
recommended that a Reserve call-up be
considered. Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the
JCS said: "McNamara and the Joint Chiefs

recommended calling up the Reserves, but
there was no mobilization because of a
political decision made by President
Johnson."12
General Wheeler, a former
Chairman of the JCS, conceded that there
were problems with mobilization. He said the
Reserves could not bc moved to combat in 90
days as was planned. They weren't ready and
needed four months.13
His statements
weakened the argument for mobilization since
draftees could be ready in almost the same
time.
In the face of the testimony recommending
a Reserve call-up, why then was there no
mobilization for the Vietnam conflict? Was
the Administration afraid of undermining
public support for the Vietnam buildup? In
retrospect, some of the factors which must
have influenced the political decision were the
adverse publicity from the Korean and Berlin
call-ups; Secretary McNamara's ongoing
attempts at reorganization of the Reserves
and National Guard; and the lack of clothing,
equipment, and training of Reserve and Guard
units.
The use of draft and officer accession
programs seemed to be the easiest way to
achieve a major military buildup and to
obtain the support of the public. New units
were activated using career personnel as cadre.
The Active Army received priority for the
acquisition of equipment, and in some cases it
drew needed equipment from the Reserve
Components. Vietnam also received priority
on the procurement of personnel, and many
specialist personnel were Withdrawn from
Europe and CONUS to fill vacancies in
Vietnam. The attempt to achieve an economy
of "guns and butter" during a period of a
major military buildup forced the military
and the State Department to compete with
other national needs to obtain assets in order
to meet all of the requirements. Other areas
of the world where troops were often needed
were left significantly undermanned.
The failure to achieve a quick and decisive
victory or an early disengagement led t o
f r u s t r a t i o n a n d t o i t s national
concomitant-discontent. Many who were
looking for a quick victory and a return to
stability were dismayed when one monthly
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draft call was followed by a larger call the
following month. The large number of
student and other deferments added to the
requirement for younger and younger
draftees
A review of the Congressional Records of
1965, 1966, and 1967 reveals that, except for
some senior members, Congress was receptive
to mobilization and could not understand
why the Defense Department did not ask for
it. Many Congressmen did not agree with the
arguments against mobilization, nor with the
idea that mobilization would be limited to a
one-year call-up, as in the case of Berlin.
During the Congressional Hearings on the
1966 Supplemental Appropriations, Senator
Stennis challenged the decision as follows:

Evidently President Johnson did not
consider the decision on Reserve mobilization
significant. It was not listed in his memoirs as
one of the five critical decisions leading t o the
buildup in Vietnam.17 The fact remains,
however, that the failure to mobilize did
affect our will of commitment, and did have a
major and lasting impact upon our career
armed forces. The burden of this decision
would, in fact, be borne by the career military
personnel in three significant areas.
PERSONNEL REPERCUSSIONS

The three major areas in which personnel
repercussions occurred because of the buildup
of our armed forces without a mobilization to
support that buildup were:
1. A r m y - w i d e individual and unit
turbulence-drastic decreases in short tour
turnaround time and assignment instability
due to priority of personnel requirements for
Vietnam;
2. Increased family separations for career
personnel-with resulting pressures to leave
the service; and
3. A deterioration of long established
values in the Army.
A r m y - w i d e Individual and Unit
Turbulence. General Westmoreland has stated
that the Vietnam war ". . . has truly stretched
the Army almost to its elastic limit."18 The
decision to rely mainly on the draft placed a
great burden on the career soldier. The failure
to mobilize combined with the one-year
rotation policy in Vietnam meant that career
officers and NCOs were transferred more
frequently in order to equalize the short tours
and t o provide experience wherever needed
throughout the Army. At the same time,
company grade officers and junior NCOs
moved with greater rapidity-from their initial
schools to a few months in CONUS or Europe
to a short tour, usually Vietnam. Assignment
instability resulted in a great deal of
dissatisfaction among many officers and
NCOs, and their families. As the war dragged
on, less time elapsed before the career soldier
found himself repeating tours in Vietnam.
Many career personnel left the service to look
for higher-paying civilian jobs, thus causing

Let me say that it seems to me, Mr.
Secretary [McNamara], that the
argument that you didn't call the
Reserves because it would only be for a
year's service, is almost an argument to
abolish the Reserves. . . .14
Secretary of Defense Laird, who was a
Republican member of Congress from
Wisconsin during this period and a member of
the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, sharply questioned the failure
to mobilize. In his opinion, the failure to call
up the Reserves was a political decision. In an
exclusive interview with US News & World
Report after becoming Secretary of Defense,
he stated: "The decision in 1965 to use the
draft to furnish much of the manpower for
Vietnam was a mistake. It would have been
better to call up the Reserve and National
Guard to help fight the war."15 In May 1966
Hanson Baldwin, military writer for The New
York Times, recommended mobilization
strongly in an article written for The Reporter
Magazine, e n t i t l e d " The Case for
Mobilization." In his book, Strategy for
Tomorrow (1970),
h e stated: "The
penny-pinching war in Vietnam-an incredible
performance for the wealthiest nation in the
world-was, in major part, a product of the
President's political failure to grasp the nettle
of a war economy, to impose economic
controls and t o mobilize."16
33

additional job turbulence for those remaining
on active duty.
Family Separations. The personnel policies
that were followed during the Vietnam
conflict led to excessive family separations
among the regular forces. The patience for
which Army wives are known was stretched
to the limit. My discussions with wives of
Transportation Officers attending the Career
Courses during the period July 1970 to July
197 I revealed that they would force their
husbands out of the service if required to
serve a third or fourth unaccompanied tour in
Vietnam 19—and
the wife's influence is far
greater than the young officer or NCO would
dare to admit. But there were many officers
who volunteered for return tours in order to
fulfill a command tour or to otherwise
enhance promotion opportunities. Naturally,
this led to the usual problems of raising a
family with the father absent. Then, to
further complicate the problem, there was the
public disapproval of t h e Vietnam
involvement that touched the lives of many
service families.
A Department of the Army study made in
1970 dealing with resignations of members of
the Military Academy Class of 1966 lists the
principal reasons for those officers leaving the
service. Noteworthy is the fact that " . . . as a
group, the resignees said they were leaving
because of excessive family separations and
the prospects of another tour in Vietnam."20
As the war in Vietnam continued, the return
of the career soldier to the combat area two,
three, or even four times, resulted in a change
in family attitudes from one of reluctant
acceptance to one of bitter resentment. The
phrase "You're not going again," changed
from a question to a statement of fact in
many Army homes.
Deterioration o f Long Established Values.
Personnel turbulence had the most direct
impact on discipline in the Army. Supervision
of subordinates suffered when leaders moved
so rapidly that they did not have sufficient
time to know their men, to instill a sense of
responsibility in them, or to pursue necessary
follow-up actions. Not only were the
immediate and middle range leaders changing
assignments rapidly, but many of the senior
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leaders were being transferred frequently as
well. In Vietnam leaders spent little time
assigned to units, thus accomplishments were
difficult to assess.
The requirement to draft large numbers of
personnel when a war had not been declared
resulted in a lowering of standards and the
acceptance of waivers for military service. In
some cases, men who had been in trouble in
civilian life were accepted by the Army and
they continued to cause disciplinary problems
after they were inducted. High hopes were
expressed for programs such as PROJECT
100,000, which was designed to accept men
with slightly below standard qualifications.
However, these programs were costly in terms
of requiring direct, individual supervision by
officers and NCOs at the expense of overall
unit discipline. It is true that, in the short run,
the restoration of discipline by the consistent
punishment of the biggest offenders will
adversely affect the so-called leadership
indicators; i.e., disciplinary statistics. But the
smart commander will recognize this fact and
make allowances for it. Senior commanders
must demand it.
One significant by-product of the failure to
mobilize and to accepting volunteers and
draftees was the fact that the Army filled its
ranks with 19 -year - olds. These youngsters
brought with them the drug abuse problem
being experienced today. A recent series of
articles in The Washington Post described the
impact of drugs in Vietnam, Europe and
CONUS. This problem strongly affects the
discipline and morale o f the unit. An
interview with LTC (Chaplain) John P.
McCullagh, a witness in the 1970 hearings
before the Senate Committee on Drug and
Alcohol Abuse, indicates that the problem
was not serious in Vietnam in 1966 or 1967
although the drugs were readily available.21
However, his later experiences at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, led him to believe that the
problem had become one of major
proportions for the military. Many of the
offenders had experimented before being
drafted. He places the age of the abuser at less
than 23 years-generally in his teens.
Therefore, had mobilization occurred in
1965, 66, or 67, more mature men than the

US ARMY

Homeward bound after a tour in Vietnam.

US A R M Y

Returning to Vietnam-a second tour for some; a third tour for others.
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of command. If we had mobilized, officers in
the Reserves and National Guard would have
been kept in their units until rotation,
thereby influencing the overall policy of
six-month commands. There would have been
sufficient pressure and Congressional interest
in maintaining this unity for mobilized units
because of the difficulties encountered in the
Korean mobilization.
Assignment instability disrupted the chain
of command and interfered with team
performance. We had many outstanding
individuals, but few, if any, outstanding teams
where the personnel knew each other well.
Through these procedures we lost the
experience and professionalism of our officers
and NCOs. One of the inevitable results of the
personnel turmoil was the decrease in
discipline and esprit de corps in our units.
Perhaps the day is past for the charismatic
leader of World War II, who could say:

19-year-old draftee would have entered active
duty at the lower enlisted and officer grades.
This addition of maturity would have
provided a settling influence and prevented
t h e drug problem from becoming as
significant as it did.
The failure to mobilize also affected the
Army's professionalism as well. General
Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, warned of this
fact in 1966, although professionalism at that
time was listed as outstanding.22 The creation
of many new units was effected by obtaining
experienced cadres from existing resources.
This led to a shortage of leaders in units and
assignment instability for the troops and their
leaders. Junior leaders were promoted quickly
to fill vacancies; thus troops found themselves
frequently with inexperienced, non-career
personnel in positions of responsibility. Some
senior officers lost confidence in our junior
officers and NCOs. To minimize losses in their
units, and to get the job done well, senior
leaders had to dig into the ranks and be more
detailed in their directions in order to make
up for the inexperience of junior leaders and
the turmoil caused by constant rotation of
personnel. You must remember that most of
the older senior officers had had 11 to 15
years of service as lieutenants before
promotion. Many of today's lieutenant
colonels served as lieutenants for 6 to 6 1/2
years before being promoted to captain. Yet,
during Vietnam, our lieutenants were being
promoted to captain with two years total
service-and it was an automatic promotion at
that, as long as they agreed to remain on
active duty for an additional year. This set of
circumstances contributed materially to a
deterioration in the "professionalism" of the
officer and noncommissioned officer corps.
Professionalism was further undermined by
the personnel policy of giving most qualified
officers a six-month command in Vietnam.
This policy turned out to be particularly
unfortunate. The pressure to get the job done
was intense. Decisions were often made with
an eye to short-run results, rather than taking
into consideration the long-term effectiveness
of the unit. Without mobilization, this policy
was conceived to allow the career officer
every opportunity for growth, including that

From my officers, I demanded the
utmost self-denial and a continued
personal example, and as a result, the
Army had a magnificent esprit de corps.
There was never any collapse of morale
among the German fighting troops, never
any surrender due to apathy or fatigue.
Discipline was always maintained and
never had to be enforced even in the most
terrible situations. (Comments by Field
Marshall Rommel written as they
occurred.)23
But we have relearned two lessons from our
Vietnam experience. We have learned again
that discipline, morale, and unit esprit
deteriorate in a system which permits
constant rotation of personnel, and that the
professional officer or NCO is a product of a
lifetime of study and experience.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Since mobilization is our strategy, what are
the implications for the National Guard and
Reserves now that we are withdrawing from
Southeast Asia and reducing our active
forces? The withdrawal of US troops and the
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reduction in active duty forces are leading to
a significant reexamination of US military
strategy. In this reexamination the need to
mobilize in the future is being declared as
national defense policy. In late 1971
Secretary of Defense Laird, in a speech to the
Association of the US Army in Washington,
D.C., and also in an interview with US News
& World Report, stressed the new policy of
"realistic deterrence" in which the National
Guard and Reserves will be subject to call. He
also stated that greater reliance will be placed
upon our allies for military support.

form, can be fleshed out, equipped and
ready for combat, considerably faster
than the West's reserve divisions.26

The Swiss are prepared to mobilize within 48
to 72 hours, and all males (with few
exceptions) receive military training. The
Israeli mobilization policy is similar to
Switzerland's. They rely on the citizen
soldier. Mobilization response is automatic,
with 48-hour readiness and a concept for the
short war.27 The question is whether or not
the United States has a similar mobilization
capability.
A realistic appraisal of our mobilization
concept is an absolute necessity. Are we
prepared t o mobilize every few years, and do
we have the national will to do so? Will
mobilization create greater dangers through
increased tension among the major powers?
How large should the active duty strength be,
and will the Reserves be adequately trained
and equipped? Will political decisions dictate
a n y major changes creating additional
turbulence in Reserve units? There has been
much pressure within the Congress to retain
individuals within their mobilized units.
Future call-ups will be made with this in
mind. Will we experience the same difficulties
the French had with their reservists during the
Algerian war? Although the active forces were
not involved, incidents were widespread
among the reservists going to war in Algeria.
These incidents included train disruptions and
anti-war parades.28
What steps are being taken to insure
mobilization response? One step that should
be taken now is to select, equip, train, and
ready for quick deployment a force of
selected Army Reserve and National Guard
units prior to any further major strength
reductions of the Active Army. These units
should identify with active duty units, at least
at the battalion and brigade level. Officer and
NCO e x c h a n g e programs should be
established. Active duty units should select
briefing teams to provide information to, and
to show an interest in, National Guard and
Reserve personnel and their dependents.
If the number of active duty divisions is
reduced, the capability must exist for

But we're [the United States] going to
have to make do with less military
manpower, and that is why we're
stressing the total force concept in
planning for a realistic deterrent during
the 1970s. That means, as I have said,
that we must place a greater reliance
upon our Reserve and National Guard,
and they must understand that they will
be called and used as a quickly available
source of manpower to augment the
active forces if we have a military
emergency.24

The timing of the response in a future
emergency will be critical. It has been said
that:
The United States is supposed to be ready
to provide within thirty days or so seven
more divisions to NATO, in addition to
the equivalent of more than five divisions
maintained in Europe. This is a "paper"
obligation; the United States has not been
capable of meeting this commitment
since 1965.25

We must address our problems in this area
carefully. There are many difficulties
associated with mobilization-particularly the
capability and national will to accomplish it.
In Hanson Baldwin's opinion, Russia was at
one time very slow.
. . .but, today the USSR's category 2 and
category 3 divisions, those maintained in
peacetime at reduced strength or in cadre
37

increasing national dissension. A return to
assignment stability is essential to overcome
the dissatisfaction of career military personnel
and their families.
Prior to the Vietnam buildup senior
military leaders planned for, and openly
spoke of, mobilization in the event of any
major US military effort. Testimony during
the early Congressional hearings indicated
that not only had the senior military leaders
recommended mobilization, but that many
members of Congress could not understand
t h e decision against mobilization. The
political results of that decision are still being
debated.
The United States is now withdrawing from
Vietnam and reducing the size of our armed
forces. Mobilization of the Reserves and
National Guard is again stated as a strategy in
the event of future buildup. T o be effective,
however, much improvement in readiness in
the Reserves and National Guard is required
to overcome the years of neglect as a result of
personnel and equipment priorities going to
the active forces. We need to develop and
rehearse procedures which will provide for the
timely activation and integration of Reserve
and National Guard forces with the active
duty forces. No further reductions in the US
active forces should occur until the officers
and men of the Reserves and National Guard
have the capability and will to respond to
immediate mobilization. The threat has not
decreased. Therefore, we can no longer afford
to pay lip service to our policy of
mobilization.

immediate mobilization. This capability has
not existed for Army units in the recent past.
T o be realistic and credible our Reserves and
National Guard units must:
1. B e e d u c a t e d i n the need for
mobilization;
2. Be
p r e p a r e d f o r individual
disruption-and possible disruption of the
local economy due to the mobilization of key
personnel;
3. Be ready for immediate mobilization
and movement to a combat or training area;
4. Be trained for mobilization-at first
announced, later unannounced;
5. Be prepared to reorganize quickly and
easily to remain compatible with active
forces; and
6. Be equipped with standardized weapons
and equipment.
SUMMARY

The unfavorable reaction to mobilization
by a few senior members of Congress
following the call-up in connection with the
Berlin mobilization alerted the Defense
Department to the apparent acceptance of the
draft as the tool to increase our armed forces.
These members of Congress questioned the
wisdom of mobilization during the Korean
war-a major mobilization effort-because it
meant that those who had already sewed their
country were serving again. This reaction
strongly influenced the thinking within the
Executive Department and the Department of
Defense.
The decision to increase our armed forces
during the Vietnam buildup through the
Selective Service System and officer
recruitment programs caused significant
l o n g - t e r m personnel repercussions,
particularly for the career military personnel.
The failure to mobilize the Reserves and
National Guard meant that the career officer
and NCO bore the burden of long-term
assignment instability, and of repetitive
unaccompanied tours overseas. The decision
resulted in personnel repercussions of
Army-wide individual and unit turbulence,
increased f a m i l y separations, and a
deterioration of discipline during a time of
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